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Abstract: This paper analyses wage dynamics in Italy in the last 25 years with a
special focus on the recent recession. Despite the rather rigid Italian institutional
setting, using linked employer-employee data we find that wage rigidities,
albeit always present, have been subdued during the recessionary years. Using
complementary data, we verify that, although we only observe daily and not
hourly wages, overtime hours are not the main mechanism behind this enhanced
wage flexibility. We document the presence of a trade-off between wage and
employment adjustments: firms historically displaying higher levels of wage
rigidities were less able to modify wages but exhibited higher turnover. A higher
share of temporary workers, whose contractual relationship may be costlessly
terminated and whose wages are therefore more frequently negotiated, served
instead as a significant wage flexibility enhancing margin. More broadly, we find
that firms of larger dimension, with a higher share of blue collar workers, or
belonging to a sector where bonuses represent a large part of annual earnings
were the ones displaying a higher level of wage flexibility.
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1 Introduction
Understanding what drives wage dynamics is important in order to explain why aggre-
gate wages tend to be much less volatile over time than what standard macroeconomic
models predict (Fig. 1). Moreover, it helps policymakers decide which policy interven-
tions to prioritize during downturns. The relatively flat evolution of aggregate wages is
usually explained through (i) the presence of wage rigidities, that is a well-known fea-
ture of many labour markets (see for example, Kahn 1997; Knoppik and Beissinger
2009; Devicienti et al. 2007; Dickens et al. 2007; and Holden and Wulfsberg 2008), and
through (ii) cyclical changes in the composition of the workforce (Lemieux 2006), since
lower-paid workers are usually more severely affected during recessions. Some recent
literature (D’Amuri 2014; Adamopoulou et al. 2016; Daly et al 2011; Verdugo 2016) in-
deed finds that composition effects have driven up aggregate wages, particularly during
the recent recession.
This paper focuses on wage rigidities and studies the distribution of wage changes
for job stayers over the last 25 years, with a particular focus on the Great Recession.
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We evaluate the determinants of wage rigidities and we describe how firms, depending
on their wage structure (e.g. share of bonuses on overall pay) and workforce compos-
ition, display very different levels of wage rigidity. Moreover, we study how firms
reacted differently along the cycle, depending on their historical level of wage rigidity.
In particular, we seek to answer whether firms which were structurally less able to ad-
just wages of job stayers reacted by adjusting employment more and whether these
firms, by hiring new workers at a re-negotiated salary which corresponds more to the
new cyclical conditions, managed to partially compress their average wage per em-
ployee, even in the presence of high levels of wage rigidity for stayers.
To measure rigidities in daily wages, we use newly available administrative employer-
employee matched data for Italy that cover the years between 1990 and 2014. We rely
on measures of wage rigidity based on the asymmetry of the distribution of yearly wage
changes for job stayers and we find important adjustments in wages during the reces-
sionary years (2009–2013). These adjustments were mostly driven by large firms and
were mainly affecting blue collars. Moreover, using a unique hand-collected dataset on
negotiated wages for employees in the metalwork industry and in the wholesale and re-
tail industry, we document that the majority of these wage adjustments were enacted
through the part of the wages that is not nationally negotiated. In addition, we show
that changes in overtime hours per day are not the main driver behind our results.
In a second stage, we point out the large heterogeneity in the ability of firms to adjust
wages and we study the determinants of this heterogeneity in the firm-level wage rigid-
ity. We find that larger firms, with a higher share of blue collar workers, which belong










































































Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data, National Accounts. 
Fig. 1 Evolution of hourly wages over time
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Finally, we show that more rigid firms reacted to the shock by increasing turnover
more, but only if they were endowed with a flexible enough workforce, i.e. with a large
share of temporary workers before the crisis. Presumably firms managed, even in the
presence of high wage rigidity, to lower their average cost per employee by workers’ re-
placement and wage renegotiation.1
Several previous studies have documented the existence of wage rigidities before the
Great Recession. An important example is Kahn (1997), who uses US data and esti-
mates that employees would experience nominal wage reductions 47% more frequently,
absent wage rigidities. Dickens et al. (2007) analyse rigidities in the USA and in 15
European countries and find that the fraction of workers subject to wage rigidity is 28%
on average, with very large heterogeneity across countries (from 4% in Ireland to 58%
in Portugal, Italy is in the middle of the distribution). By analysing wage rigidities
during the recent downturn, we complement recent findings for the USA, the UK and
Europe that find evidence of increased flexibility during the recent recession (Kurmann
et al 2014; Brandolini and Rosolia 2015; Elsby et al. 2016; Verdugo 2016). We contrib-
ute to this literature by investigating more thoroughly which are the main determinants
of wage rigidity/flexibility.
In addition, our paper speaks to the literature on the relationship between wage flexi-
bility and employment. The available literature is much scarcer in this case and the evi-
dence is mixed: Card and Hyslop (1997) find that wage rigidities have small effects on
the economy, Pischke (2016) and Ehrlich and Montes (2015) find instead that wage ri-
gidities are associated with lower employment levels. We contribute to this debate by
exploiting the richness of our data in terms of variables and time span to study how
firms responded to negative shocks, depending on their degree of wage rigidity and
their workforce composition.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses the Italian institu-
tional setting; Section 3 describes the datasets used for the analysis, and Section 4 stud-
ies the presence of wage rigidities for job stayers. Section 5 analyses separately the
evolution of the nationally negotiated and the residual part of the wages. Section 6 esti-
mates the relationship between wage adjustments, employment adjustments and the
average wage per employee at the firm level. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional setting
The evolution of wages in Italy is strictly linked to its institutional setting of labour
relations.
Since the income policy agreements of 1993, the Italian industrial relations are orga-
nized around two pillars. The first pillar is the national collective agreement (Contratto
Collettivo Nazionale di Lavoro, CCNL), a sector-specific labour contract negotiated be-
tween the sector employers’ association and the main trade unions. Its functions in-
clude the definition of the framework that disciplines the main aspects of labour
utilization and the safeguard of real wage levels. The contracts are renewed every
3 years (since 2009, it used to be every 2 years before 2009) by the main social partners.
Nominal increases of the base (minimum) wage are benchmarked to an independent 3-
year-ahead forecast of inflation net of imported energetic goods. The social parties
agree on the level and the evolution of the base (minimum) wage to be applied to each
occupation category (distinguishing various types of blue and white collar workers, as
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well as middle managers, depending on the sector) over the 3-year horizon. The second
pillar is constituted by firm- or area-level labour contracts. Pay negotiations at the firm
level are intended to account for firm-specific developments and local conditions, such
as improved productivity or the risk of job loss. These are subordinate to the national
one and can (i) modify items related to labour utilization, if the national contract allows
them to, or regulate aspects not explicitly covered by the first level and (ii) provide for
additional wage increases, which should both redistribute firm-level productivity gains
(possibly achieved by the very same firm-level contract through more efficient
organization) and align the labour cost to the ongoing labour market conditions. How-
ever, only in well-delimited cases of firm’s restructuring or crisis, second-level deals can
(temporarily) cut wages below the nationally set sectoral minimum. Still, although le-
gally possible, there is little evidence of firm-level agreement envisaging a decrease in
the wage below these minima during the period of our analysis (D’Amuri et al. 2015).
Furthermore, despite the introduction of fiscal incentives to promote firm- and local-
level bargaining, these agreements are not very widespread (only 20% of firms with
more than 20 employees in 2010) and are limited to larger firms and to specific sectors,
respectively (D’Amuri et al. 2015).
This mechanism of wage negotiation inevitably results in some degree of downward
wage rigidity as employers are constrained by the nationally negotiated minima agreed
upon by the main social parties every 3 years. In case of a negative shock in firms’ per-
formance, this predetermination of wages over the contractual horizon by itself reduces
the possibilities of timely adjustments, at least for the centrally bargained component.
However, wages may still be flexible thanks to the part that is not centrally negotiated,
representing on average 20% of wages.2,3
For what concerns the form of labour contracts, since 1997, the Italian labour market
is characterized by the presence of both permanent and temporary contracts. However,
although temporary contracts are becoming more widespread, more than 85% of all
employees are still permanent ones. Depending upon the size of the firm (whether it is
above 15 employees), there is also a relatively more stringent employment protection
legislation regarding permanent workers (Cappellari et al. 2012). This somewhat limits
the ability of firms to fire workers in case of a negative shock.
Therefore, wage rigidities and employment protection legislation interact in the evo-
lution of wage and employment adjustments over the business cycle.
3 Data
The source for the data consists of social security payments made by legal entities to
the Italian National Social Security Institute (INPS) for all employees with open-ended,
fixed-term and apprenticeship contracts between 1990 and 2014. From this master
data, INPS extracts two datasets. The first consists of the universe of firms with at least
one employee at some point during a given calendar year—this extraction runs only up
to 2013 and provides data at the firm level. The second consists of the employment his-
tories of all workers born on the first or the ninth day of each month (24 dates). The
firm extraction contains the fiscal code; information on the average number of em-
ployees over the year and the gross wage bill by occupational category—blue collar,
white collar, middle and top manager; the two-digit sector code (NACE 2002) and the
province code; and the date of entry and exit (if any). The worker extraction provides
Adamopoulou et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2016) 5:22 Page 4 of 32
information on demographics, the annual gross wage, the number of days worked, ma-
ternity and sick leave as well as short time work benefits (STWB, Cassa integrazione
guadagni) but only for the period 2005–2014. We restrict attention to the non-
agricultural business sector and workers aged between 20 and 64. We use the fiscal
code as the definition of the firm. Tables 1 and 2 report the descriptive statistics for the
sample of firms and workers respectively. Our sample of workers covers about 7% of
the total workforce in the non-agricultural business sector while the firm data refer to
the universe of firms with at least one employee (see Adamopoulou et al. 2016).
4 Rigidities of nominal wages
This section studies the evolution over time of wage rigidities in Italy in the non-
agricultural business sector between 1990 and 2014. In line with the existing literature
on wage rigidities (for Italy Devicienti et al. 2007), we restrict the analysis to the sample
of “super-stayers” in order to analyse wage changes net of composition effects: we keep
only full-time workers aged 20–64, who have worked for two consecutive years (for at
least 52 weeks and at least 200 days per year), in the same firm, with the same contract
Table 1 Descriptive statistics, universe of firms paying contribution at INPS
Year % of firms in
industry
% of firms in
manufacturing
Wage per employee Firm size N firms N employees
(1000)
Mean sd Mean sd
1990 0.49 0.32 1102 457 7.96 182.3 1,116,992 8891
1991 0.48 0.32 1217 495 7.96 181.0 1,120,621 8920
1992 0.48 0.31 1288 539 7.86 188.1 1,122,468 8823
1993 0.47 0.31 1334 556 7.80 184.2 1,084,614 8460
1994 0.47 0.31 1382 579 7.83 180.2 1,059,329 8295
1995 0.47 0.30 1441 620 7.87 179.1 1,063,816 8372
1996 0.47 0.30 1492 646 7.94 172.9 1,069,946 8495
1997 0.46 0.30 1550 670 7.96 163.1 1,058,116 8423
1998 0.46 0.29 1580 697 7.97 156.2 1,082,872 8630
1999 0.45 0.28 1595 711 7.86 138.3 1,136,162 8930
2000 0.44 0.27 1637 766 7.97 139.1 1,181,332 9415
2001 0.44 0.27 1675 821 7.98 140.1 1,222,383 9755
2002 0.44 0.26 1693 788 7.73 133.2 1,293,290 9997
2003 0.44 0.25 1728 819 7.70 130.0 1,325,115 10203
2004 0.43 0.24 1765 837 7.59 127.9 1,369,569 10395
2005 0.42 0.24 1816 892 7.56 128.7 1,380,837 10439
2006 0.42 0.23 1872 938 7.55 132.0 1,403,806 10599
2007 0.42 0.22 1898 994 7.53 133.5 1,474,110 11100
2008 0.41 0.22 1973 1030 7.57 129.0 1,496,808 11331
2009 0.40 0.22 1975 1006 7.48 146.9 1,478,586 11060
2010 0.39 0.21 2031 1055 7.43 169.6 1,471,068 10930
2011 0.38 0.21 2068 1070 7.46 165.1 1,467,732 10949
2012 0.37 0.21 2073 1086 7.35 167.6 1,468,611 10794
2013 0.36 0.21 2100 1139 7.44 169.1 1,414,664 10525
Source: own calculations on INPS data for the universe of firms. Statistics of wages are weighted by the number of
employees in the firm
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(full time/part time and fixed term/open ended) and position (blue collar/white collar/
middle manager) and who were not under short time work benefits (CIG/fondo di soli-
darietà; only since 2005 when the information becomes available).4 Excluding workers
under short time work benefits is important when analysing the cyclicality of wage
changes for stayers as these schemes are strongly anti-cyclical. Some other forms of
measurement error in daily wage (level and/or change) remains inevitable, for instance,
because of episodes of maternity or sick leave or because of adjustments in overtime
hours. As long as this measurement error is not correlated with the business cycle, it
should not pose a serious concern for our analysis that studies wage rigidity over time.
We further show in a robustness exercise that changes in overtime hours that are likely
to be correlated with the cycle do not affect our results.
We construct the daily wage for each worker by dividing the total annual wage by the
number of days worked during the year, and we calculate the percentage change in
daily wages for the sample of workers defined above.5,6 We exclude the outliers of the
daily wage changes distribution (1st and 99th percentile).
The upper panel of Fig. 2 plots the distributions of the annual change in daily wage
for 2006 (before the first part of the recession) and 2009 (during the first part of the re-
cession). Each plot includes a solid vertical line at 0 to denote the threshold for nom-
inal wage rigidities, a dotted vertical line at the inflation rate to denote the possible
threshold for real wage rigidities and a dashed one that is a proxy of aggregate product-
ivity developments (annual percentage change of value added per worker). We observe
that in 2006, the distribution is skewed to the right, implying that the mass of em-
ployees who experienced a wage change above the median is larger than the mass of
those who experienced a wage change below the median. The peak of the distribution
is around the inflation rate, and there is an “excessive” concentration between zero
and the inflation rate. Moreover, the share of employees who received a daily wage
cut in 2006 is significantly lower. Instead, in 2009, the distribution shifts to the left
and becomes much more symmetric. The lower panel of Fig. 2 presents the distribu-
tions of the annual change in daily wage for 2010 (a period of slight recovery) and
2013 (during the second part of the recession). We observe that the mass of the dis-
tribution shifted to the right as soon as there was a slight recovery in 2010 but shifted
again to the left in 2013.
4.1 The measures of wage rigidity
In this paper, we adopt a flexible approach for the estimates of wage rigidities: the only
assumption we make is that the distribution of the notional wage changes is symmetric
around the median.7 This implies that the only thing that distinguishes a scenario of
rigid wages from a scenario of fully flexible wages is the presence of asymmetries in the
distribution of wage changes. The assumption that the distribution of the notional wage
changes is symmetric is in line with a large strand of the literature that adopts more
parametric approaches (Dickens et al. 2007; Goette et al. 2007; Devicienti et al. 2007;
Card and Hyslop 1997). Our methodology, adopted also by Verdugo (2016) to study
wage cyclicality in Europe, differs because it does not make any parametric assumption
on the mean and variance of the notional wage changes distribution. We just assume
that, absent wage rigidities, the bottom half of the distribution would mirror the upper
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half. For instance, we allow the mean and the standard deviation of the notional wage
change distribution to freely vary over time.
Moreover, in this paper, we decided not to distinguish between nominal and real
wage rigidities because they are usually identified by observing spikes either around
0 or around the inflation rate. However, since we are considering years of very low
inflation, it is difficult to separately identify the two types of rigidities (see
Devicienti et al. 2007).
Therefore, all measures of wage rigidity we use are based on the notion that the no-
tional wage changes distribution is symmetrically distributed around the median and
that observing a missing mass below 0 (or below the inflation rate) implies higher level
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2013
Source: own calculations on INPS data (on the sample of job stayers).
Notes: The solid vertical line corresponds to the 0 threshold for nominal wage rigidities,
the dotted vertical line corresponds to the inflation rate threshold for real wage
rigidities and the dashed line corresponds to aggregate productivity developments
(annual percentage change of value added per worker).
Fig. 2 Distribution of percentage annual change of daily wages, private non-agricultural sector
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skewness. Second, we compute the so-called Kelley’s skewness. This alternative meas-
ure of the asymmetry of a distribution relies on the quantiles of the distribution, and it
has the advantage of being robust to extreme observations (it was proposed by Guve-
nen et al. 2014 and adopted also by Verdugo 2016). It is computed as the relative differ-
ence between the upper and lower tail densities (L90–50 − L50–10) / L90–10. A
negative number indicates that the lower tail is larger than the upper tail, and vice versa
for a positive number. This measure has also the advantage of accounting for measure-
ment error or changes in hours worked that may emerge as outliers in the data. Finally,
as a robustness check, we look at the percentage of employees with a recorded negative
wage change, which is used by Elsby et al. (2016) to analyse wage adjustments and wage
rigidity in the USA and in the UK during the crisis.
While the first two measures are positively related to rigidity (i.e. a distribution of
delta wages skewed towards the left), the last one is negatively related to rigidity.
4.2 Possible confounding factors
We now discuss which other factors, apart from the actual flexibility of hourly wages,
may lie behind the observed changes in daily wages. Daily wages may vary because of
changes in the hourly wage or because of changes in hours per day (e.g. overtime):
Δdaily w≈Δh  wþ Δw  h;
where h are hours of work per day and w is hourly wage (which is partly negotiated at
the national level and partly decided at the firm level). Kurmann et al. (2014) show that
adjustments in hours were relevant in explaining adjustments of daily wages, at least in
the USA.
The INPS data do not contain information on hours worked per day that would allow
us to verify whether the decrease in daily wages has been accompanied by a decrease in
hourly wages. We therefore seek information from external sources. First, we evaluate
the importance of overtime pay on total wages, using the Structure of Earnings Survey
in 2006. We find that overtime pay accounted for a relatively low portion (around 4%)
of monthly earnings in the industrial sector, excluding construction. Even if this
amount is modest, adjustments in overtime hours may still account for a significant
fraction of observed daily wage changes. However, in Section 6.1, we use data on the
universe of workers employed in a sub-sample of firms8 for which we observe the over-
time and total hours, and we find that overtime (as a fraction of total hours) is uncorre-
lated with the degree of wage rigidity at the firm level. This suggests that overtime
hours are not associated with wage flexibility.
Another source of possible measurement error comes from una tantum payments,
which are lump sum top-ups paid in case of delays in the renewal of the collective con-
tract. These payments (una tantum) that range between a few hundred up to more
than one thousand euros could result in positive wage changes in the year when they
are paid, followed by spurious negative wage changes in the year after. Since many con-
tracts were renewed in 2008, una tantum payments could induce a fictitious decline in
the observed wage flexibility in 2009, at the time when the crisis hit the Italian econ-
omy. The INPS data do not contain separate information on the different components
of wages and in particular on una tantum payments. We therefore use external infor-
mation on una tantum payments published by the Italian National Statistical Institute
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(ISTAT) to net our wage measure from this component. Figure 3 shows that the distri-
bution of wage changes remains practically unaffected in 2009 and in 2006, once we
exclude these top-ups.
4.3 Results
From Fig. 2, it is already possible to evaluate how the symmetry of the distribution has
changed during the recent crisis. The figure indeed points towards a partial increase in
wage flexibility during the recession, in line with the findings of Brandolini and Rosolia
(2015) and Verdugo (2016) for the EU and the ones of Kurmann et al. (2014) for the
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2009
Source: own calculations on INPS data (on the sample of job stayers).
Notes: The solid vertical line corresponds to the 0 threshold for nominal wage rigidities,
the dotted vertical line corresponds to the inflation rate threshold for real wage
rigidities and the dashed line corresponds to aggregate productivity developments
(annual percentage change of value added per worker).
Fig. 3 Distribution of percentage annual change of daily wages, private non-agricultural sector, with and
without una tantum
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increased back to 0.6 in 2010 and dropped to 0.4 in 2013. Overall, wage rigidities
seemed to be subdued during the period 2009–2013 compared to the pre-recessionary
years. Such flexibility was not reflected in aggregate wages possibly because compos-
ition effects have dominated (Adamopoulou et al. 2016).
Figure 4 reports the evolution of our three different measures of rigidity in the last
25 years for employees in the private sector excluding agriculture. Both the first (dash-
dotted line) and the second (solid line) measure display a drop after 2009, showing that
the distribution of annual wage changes became less asymmetric to the right. The per-
centage of employees with a recorded negative wage change (dashed line) mirrors these
measures by featuring an increase after 2009. Almost 30% of job stayers have a re-
corded negative wage change in 2009 while this figure is around 20% in normal
times.9,10,11 Overall, the coherence between these three measures of rigidity is high: the
simple correlation between Kelley’s skewness and the standard measure of skewness is
0.9 and that with the share of wage cuts is 0.3. Given the frequent presence of outliers
in wage changes, in the rest of the paper, we report only the Kelley’s skewness and the
share of employees with recorded negative wage change. The results with skewness are
available upon request.
These measures of skewness for the overall private non-agricultural sector may
mask considerable heterogeneity across different types of workers or firms. Figure 5
shows the evolution of Kelley’s skewness for employees in different positions: blue
collars, white collars and middle managers. We observe that the skewness decreased
more for blue collars (dashed line). White collars and middle managers were af-
fected to a lesser extent. The percentage of employees with a recorded negative
wage change rose after 2009 especially among middle managers (Fig. 6). This may
be due to the high incidence of bonuses for this particular category of workers,
which allowed firms to cut wages more homogeneously, shifting the distribution of
wage changes to the left without affecting its shape as much as for other occupa-
tional categories.
Regarding differences across sectors, we observe that employees in the industrial
sector excluding construction experienced more wage cuts during the recessionary
years and the largest drop in the skewness of the distribution of wage changes
(Figs. 7 and 8).12 Lastly, we observe important differences between firms of different sizes

































































skewness Kelley's skewness % of employees with wage cut (right axis)
Source: own calculations on INPS data (on the sample of job stayers). Non-agricultural business sector.
Fig. 4 Evolution of wage rigidities over time
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medium-sized and large firms managed to reduce wages more than small firms, possibly
due to the larger share of bonuses related to firms’ performance.13 This result is consistent
with what found with the skewness measure with the exception of very large firms (with
250 employees or more). These firms usually display a higher level of flexibility, but their
distribution of wage changes experienced a smaller drop in the skewness during the crisis.
The discrepancy between the evolution of the skewness and of the percentage of em-
ployees with a recorded negative wage change in very large firms again may be due to the
fact that large firms pay wages on average well above the minimum and were able to ad-
just wages more homogeneously.
All in all, we document the presence of some degree of higher wage flexibility during
the recent recession even in a context like the Italian one where some institutional fea-
tures of the labour market, like the way wages are bargained, may make wages rather
rigid. In the next section, we focus on a case study in order to understand better how
wages were adjusted in such an institutional environment.
5 Wage drift
As mentioned above, wages are made up of two components, a nationally negotiated
base wage and a residual part set at the firm level. On average, in Italy, they account
for about 80 and 20% of total wage, respectively; half of the firm level component





















































Blue Collars White Collars Middle Managers
Source: own calculations on INPS data (on the sample of job stayers).

















































Blue Collars White Collars Middle Managers
Source: own calculations on INPS data (on the sample of job stayers).
Fig. 6 Negative wage changes by position, % of employees
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studies the different behaviour of the nationally negotiated and the residual part of daily
wages, as well as the way they interact with each other, to pin down possible mecha-
nisms behind the higher wage flexibility for different types of workers and firms.
INPS wage data lack separate information on the various components of wages in
order to understand where the flexibility comes from. We separate the two parts using
a unique dataset that has been hand-collected15 and provides us with information over
time about negotiated wages for two national contracts: metalwork industry and whole-
sale and retail trade. These national contracts cover respectively around 25 and 15% of
all employees in the private non-agricultural sector in Italy. As described in Section 2,
negotiated wages set minima for workers according to their sector and contractual pos-
ition. In the INPS data, we identify blue collars, white collars and middle managers.
Since in the national contracts, these categories are finer (there are three categories for
blue collars, four categories for white collars and two for middle managers), we need to
aggregate them in order to match them with the social security data. Although this ag-









































































Industry (excluding construction) Construction Services
Source: own calculations on INPS data (on the sample of job stayers).







































































Industry (excluding construction) Construction Services
Source: own calculations on INPS data (on the sample of job stayers).
Fig. 8 Negative wage changes by sector, % of employees
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look at wage changes instead of wage levels, since the agreed percentage changes are
usually similar across broad positions.
Figures 11 and 12 show the evolution of the part of the wage that excludes the na-
tionally negotiated minima in each sector by the employees’ position (black line).
Among metalworkers, we observe a large drop in 2009, i.e., at the onset of the crisis,
for blue collars and white collars while middle managers were only mildly affected.
In 2014, there is another drop, but only for blue collars. By contrast, those that suf-
fered mostly in 2009 among the employees in the wholesale and retail trade were
the middle managers. Blue collars and white collars experienced instead a large drop
in 2014. These different reactions in the residual part of wages may reflect sectorial
differences in the structure of wages (bonuses) and/or overtime hours. The non-
negotiated part of wages is larger for large firms, for workers in the metalwork in-
dustry and for middle managers.
We then repeat the exercise of the previous section and calculate measures of the
skewness using the part of the wage that is not negotiated at the national level rather







































































1-9 employees 10-49 employees
50-49 employees 250 employees or more
Source: own calculations on INPS data (on the sample of job stayers).



































































1-9 employees 10-49 employees
50-49 employees 250 employees or more
Source: own calculations on INPS data (on the sample of job stayers).
Fig. 10 Negative wage changes by firm size, % employees
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flexible (the level of skewness associated with it is lower and the share of wage cuts is
higher). In particular, in 2006, the Kelley’s skewness in the wholesale and retail trade
sector was 0.07 for the residual part and 0.31 for the overall wage (0.02 and 0.14 for
the metalwork industry). Moreover, in line with our previous graphs, we observe that
the skewness of the residual part of wages decreases, even towards negative values, in
2009, especially among blue collars in the metalworkers contract and among middle
managers in the wholesale and retail trade sector.
The information on the negotiated and residual part of the wage also allows us to in-
vestigate whether an increase in the negotiated wage induces firms to adjust the other
component of the wage. The red line in Figs. 11 and 12 represents the negotiated part
of the wages. Note that due to the institutional setting, the evolution of the negotiated
part of the wages is sticky as it is usually predetermined for 3 years. As a result the ne-













































































































































































































Residual Part of Wages over Total (%)
Daily wages: Metal Workers
Source: own calculations on INPS data (on the sample of job stayers).
Fig. 11 Changes in the nationally negotiated and residual part of wages over time, by workers’
position. Metalworkers
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(grey area).16 However, a simple graphical inspection of the evolution of the negotiated
(red line) and residual (black line) part of the wages shows that in 2009 and in 2014,
firms compensated for the increase of the negotiated part of the wages by reducing the
residual component.17
6 Wage rigidities, employment adjustments and firms’ average employee
compensation
Wage rigidities may induce firms to perform adjustments along the employment mar-
gin as an alternative way to react to shocks. Devicienti et al. (2007) find that in the
1990s, firms with higher downward rigidities in Italy tended to display higher worker
reallocation rates in terms of turnover. In this section, we study whether firms that are
historically characterized by high wage rigidities adjusted employment more during the

















































































































































































































Residual Part of Wages over Total (%)
Daily wages: Wholesale and Trade
Source: own calculations on INPS data (on the sample of job stayers)
Fig. 12 Changes in the nationally negotiated and residual part of wages over time, by workers’ position.
Workers in the wholesale and trade sector
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To do so, we make use of an alternative dataset that covers the universe of employees
for a sample of firms with more than 20 employees. Observing the universe of em-
ployees in each firm is crucial in order to define an accurate measure of wage rigidities
at the firm level. These data come from INPS as well, and refer to the universe of em-
ployees in the firms that belong to the Bank of Italy’s yearly survey on industrial and
non-financial service firms (INVIND), and consist of around 4000 firms per year. An-
other advantage of using this dataset of employees is that we can enrich it with extra
variables at the firm level that come directly from the INVIND survey. For example,
INVIND allows us to separately observe accessions and separations that could only in-
directly and partially be proxied by monthly employment changes in the INPS firm
data. Moreover, INVIND provides us with additional information, like total sales (in
euros) that can serve as a demand-shift control. There is also information on per capita
overtime hours that can help us verify that the wage adjustment is not operated
through this channel only.18
6.1 Wage rigidity: firms’ heterogeneity
We now dig into the determinants of wage rigidity. In particular, we study how the de-
gree of wage rigidity differs among firms and which characteristics of the firm deter-
mine such heterogeneity.
In order to perform this analysis, we need to compute a measure of wage rigidity at
the firm level. In particular, we aim at constructing a measure that summarizes the
firms’ ability to adjust wages of incumbents when hit by a shock, for example, because
of higher bonuses or higher bargaining power. Similarly to what we did in Section 4,
we base our measure on the asymmetry of the distribution of wage changes before the
crisis. For each firm belonging to the INVIND sample, we compute the Kelley’s skew-
ness of the distribution of yearly wage changes for job stayers and we average across
the years between 2003 and 2008. This measure relies on the same assumptions de-
scribed in Section 4. Positive values of the skewness are associated with the presence of
wage rigidities, while values close to 0 point towards wage flexibility. We exclude all
firms with few job stayers (less than 80 in the period 2003–2008) because the skewness
measure would not be reliable if the number of observations in the distribution of wage
changes is too small.19 Figure 13 shows how our firm-level measure of wage rigidity is
distributed. The mean is larger than 0 (it is 0.13), implying that it exists some form of
wage rigidity on average. Moreover, there is a high level of heterogeneity across firms
(the standard deviation is 0.19).
We consider three main factors behind differences in wage rigidity across firms: the
presence of a large component of bonuses; the extensive use of overtime hours, which
are easier to adjust during downturns; and the actual ability to adjust the base salary of
job stayers, due to high bargaining power, for instance. Figure 14 shows how our meas-
ure of rigidity is correlated with the amount of bonuses (over annual earnings) at the
sector level. The figure displays on the x-axis the share of bonuses over earnings as ob-
tained from the Structure of Earnings Survey in 2006 and on the y-axis our measure of
wage rigidity averaged at the sector level. There is a negative correlation: those sectors
whose wage structure is on average characterized by a high share of bonuses are the
ones that according to our measure of wage rigidity are more flexible.
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Table 3 shows the determinants of our measure of wage rigidity. Column 1 shows
that larger firms, whose average wages are less often flattened upon the national
contractual wages, tend to be less rigid, which is in line with the results of Ada-
mopoulou et al. (2016) and with those in Section 4. Again in line with the results
of our previous section, column 2 shows that firms are less rigid if they are char-
acterized by a high share of blue collars. Column 3 shows instead that our meas-
ure of wage rigidity is not related with the amount of overtime hours employed by
each firm. This suggests that wages are not flexible simply because of the firms’
ability to adjust overtime hours. Column 4 shows that there is a positive associ-
ation between firms’ productivity and firms’ rigidity. This result is consistent with
the theory of efficiency wages (Akerlof 1982; Stiglitz 1986; Campbell and Kamlani
1997). Firms may decide not to cut wages because wage cuts reduce workers’ effort
and overall productivity. Productivity would therefore be positively associated with
higher level of rigidity both because workers not experiencing a wage cut are more
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Note: own calculations from INPS data, INVIND sample. Mean = 0.13, standard deviation = 0.17.
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Note: quota of annual bonuses on annual earnings obtained from the Structure of Earnings survey, 2006.
The fitting line is computed excluding the construction sector.
Fig. 14 Wage rigidity and share of bonuses at the sector level
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resources to decide not to cut wages. Finally, column 5 shows that firms with a
high share of temporary workers tend to be more rigid: we interpret this as a sign
that rigid firms, envisaging their difficulty in adjusting wages of job stayers, react
by hiring a large share of temporary workers, easier to fire.
Lastly, we conducted a robustness check in order to verify that observing daily in-
stead of hourly wages does not undermine our results of Section 4. We use the infor-
mation provided by the INVIND survey on the amount of overtime hours per capita in
2008 (i.e. before the crisis) at the firm level and we classify firms into more and less
overtime-intensive (above and below the median). We then compute the skewness of
the distribution of annual changes of daily wages for all workers belonging to each
group of firms for the years 2006 and 2009. We find that for both groups, the skewness
was almost identical in 2006 and it declined sharply in 2009 by almost the same
amount (Fig. 15). Therefore, we conclude that overtime hours do not seem to drive the
observed increase in wage flexibility in 2009.
In the next section, we study how firms characterized by different levels of wage ri-
gidity respond to the recent recession.
6.2 Firms’ wage rigidity and employment adjustments
We perform regressions at the firm level to evaluate the relationship between the meas-
ure of wage rigidity described above and firms’ adjustments in the employment margin
and in their average wage per employee during the recent recession.
We estimate the following equation:
Δyi;t−08 ¼ αþ β skewnessi þ γXi þ εi ð1Þ
where yi,t − 08 are flows of the outcome variables during the recent recession (between









in the average wage per year per employee av wagetav wage2008 −1
 
and the probability of exiting
the market. skewnessi is the Kelley’s skewness measure that refers to the 6 years before
the recession, as described in Section 6.1.
Since we want in principle to isolate the effect of wage rigidity from the effect of
other factors such as the firm size, that may be associated with both a more flexible
wage structure and different dynamics of our dependent variables, we control in all
specifications for firms’ value added per worker, firms’ age, size, level of overtime hours
per employee, share of temporary workers, province and sector of activity. All controls
refer to the year 2008, i.e. right before the arrival of the crisis, in order to exclude en-
dogenous changes of these variables correlated with the effect of interest. Moreover, in
some specifications, we include the variation of total sales during the recession as add-
itional control, in order to correct for the heterogeneity of the shocks across firms.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.21
Therefore, the β coefficient of our regressions measures the relationship between
wage rigidity at the firm level and employment adjustments, net of the effect of other
potential (observable) factors that may spur our estimate.22
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Table 4 displays the main descriptive statistics. Firms in the INVIND sample mostly
belong to the industrial sector and are of rather large dimension. Temporary workers
represent on average 7% of their workforce. Average turnover in 2009 was 20% with re-
spect to the number of employees in 2008 and separations were slightly larger than
accessions.
Table 5 presents our main results on turnover. In line with Devicienti et al.
(2007), we find that firms with higher wage rigidities are characterized by higher
turnover in 2009 (column 1). In particular, an increase in the firm-level skewness
by one standard deviation (0.16) is associated with a turnover rate in 2009 of al-
most 0.7 percentage points higher. One may worry about possible omitted variables
in this regression. In particular, it may be that more rigid firms may be hit
Firms with low level of overtime hours per capita in 2008
skewness=0.5 kewness=0.19
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2009
Source: own calculations on INVIND data (on the sample of job stayers).
Fig. 15 Distribution of percentage annual change of daily wages, by firms’ level of overtime hours per
capita in 2008
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differently by the crisis. Column 2 shows that the results are robust to the inclu-
sion of the percentage change of sales, our proxy for the size of the firm-level
shock. However, this control of the demand shock is potentially endogenous, as it
refers to 2009 and may be considered as an outcome itself. We therefore exclude
it from our preferred specification. We also examine whether the effect of wage ri-
gidities persists over time by considering turnover in 2011 and in 2013 (computed
as the cumulative rate of accessions and separations with respect to 2008). Indeed,
the effect is still present and increasing both in 2011 and 2013. This may be rec-
onciled with a delayed employment adjustment for firms that start exhausting any
margin of wage adjustment.
At this point, it is crucial to understand the nature of this increased turnover. In par-
ticular, it is interesting to explore whether it is mainly driven by separations or acces-
sions and which may be the channel behind it. One possible mechanism acts through
the increased turnover of temporary workers (see Bulligan and Viviano, 2016). Firms
that are constrained by wage rigidities may exploit the turnover of temporary workers
either to renegotiate their wage or to hire a different worker, whose wage will reflect
the new cyclical conditions. In this way, firms can exploit flexibility on the employment
margin in order to adjust their average labour cost.




% Accessions2009 0.087 0.142
% Separations2009 0.107 0.132
Turnover2011 0.579 0.751
% Accessions2011 0.276 0.391
% Separations2011 0.300 0.365
Turnover2013 0.905 1.198
% Accessions2013 0.439 0.629
% Separations2013 0.466 0.585
% Δ(firm’s average wage)2009 −0.010 0.080
% Δ(firm’s average wage)2011 0.061 0.089
% Δ(firm’s average wage)2013 0.092 0.119
% Temporary employees2008 0.068 0.115
Firm size2008 468 2152
% Industry 0.760 –
Firm age2008 25.89 13.15
Value added per worker2008 71.09 74.28
Overtime hours per worker2008 5336 3062
% Δ(sales)2009 0.068 0.115
Source: The skewness is taken from INPS data on the population of workers belonging to firms in the INVIND sample.
Turnover, accessions, separations, share of temporary workers, overtime hours per worker and sales from the INVIND
survey. Average wage, firm size, age and sector from INPS data on the population of firms. Value added per worker from
CERVED. Turnover2011, accessions2011 and separations2011 are cumulative for the years 2009–2011, turnover2013,
accessions2013 and separations2013 are cumulative for the years 2009–2013. All variables in %Δ are defined with 2008 as
base year
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The INVIND data allow us to distinguish whether the effect on turnover is driven by
accessions, separations or both. Tables 6 and 7 present separately the results for acces-
sions and separations as a share of employment in 2008. We distinguish between firms
with high and low share of temporary workers in 2008 in order to understand whether
the proposed mechanism may be at work.23 We find that firms that are characterized
by higher wage rigidities tend to hire but also to fire more in 2009 as well as in 2011
and 2013. Moreover, we find that this effect comes mostly from firms with a high share
of temporary workers (columns 2, 4 and 6) than from firms with a low share of tempor-
ary workers (columns 1, 3 and 5), even if very rigid.24 Note that the coefficient of skew-
ness related to the accessions is larger than the one related to separations. This may be
because separations do not include only firings but also voluntary quits or other types
of job termination. If wage cuts operated by less rigid firms led to voluntary quits of
workers who did not want to accept them, then overall separations should be large in
flexible firms as well. Since our coefficient compares the effect of more and less rigid
firms on overall separations, the difference may be smaller for separations exactly be-
cause flexible firms display larger quit rates during the recession as well. At the mo-
ment, we cannot verify this explanation because our data do not contain information
on separations net of voluntary quits.
Lastly, we use information on the average wage per employee paid by the firm (avail-
able in the INPS data for the universe of firms) to test whether in the presence of wage
rigidities, the temporary-worker channel allowed firms to decrease the average wage in-
directly. Table 8 shows the results. As expected, more rigid firms (with higher value of
skewness) adjusted their average wage less: the changes in average wage are more posi-
tive for rigid firms during the recession. However, firms with a higher share of tempor-
ary workers managed to adjust wages more. This is true both in 2009 and 2011. In
2013, the signs are reverted. We believe that this is due to sample selection/survivor
bias that spurs our results.25 We conclude that firms managed, through the use of tem-
porary workers, to partly contain their labour cost per employee even in the presence
of wage rigidities.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we document the evolution of wage rigidities over time in Italy and we
find that during the recent recession wage flexibility has increased. We study the vari-
ous channels though which daily-wage adjustments were enacted and we reveal that
the part of the wages that is not nationally negotiated responded more to the adverse
cyclical conditions. Other main determinants of wage flexibility are the incidence of bo-
nuses over total earnings, the share of blue collar workers and the firm size. Although
we only observe daily and not hourly wages, overtime hours did not seem to be the
main driver behind the observed wage developments.
We also conduct an analysis at the firm level and we identify firms that were historic-
ally characterized by different levels of wage rigidities in order to study their behaviour
during the crisis. We find that there is a wage employment trade-off also as far as their
adjustment is concerned: firms structurally characterized by higher wage rigidity ad-
justed more often along the employment margin by increasing their turnover in the
period 2009–2013. These larger employment adjustments were mostly driven by rigid
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firms with a high enough share of temporary workers, easier to fire. Moreover, we find
that the average wage per employee of rigid firms adjusted less during the crisis but
that those firms endowed with a larger portion of temporary workers managed to partly
compress their average labour cost in any case. Our conjecture is that these firms man-
aged to deal with the challenges of the recessionary conditions not by directly reducing
wages of job stayers but by indirectly containing the labour cost through firing of tem-
porary workers and hiring of new ones with lower salaries. This source of flexibility
through temporary workers allowed firms to survive in a rigid institutional setting. Re-
forms of the latter may reduce the need of using temporary workers as a flexibility mar-
gin during downturns.
Our study provides some evidence on wage adjustments in Italy during the Great Re-
cession and on the way firms reacted differently to the crisis. However, it does not quan-
tify how much this increased flexibility contributed to helping firms absorb the negative
shocks and its overall implications for the economy. We leave this question, of high pol-
icy relevance but which requires additional assumptions in order to construct a proper
counterfactual, to future research.
Endnotes
1Given that firms characterized by a rigid wage structure may choose to hire more tem-
porary workers as a response to the crisis, we evaluate the heterogeneity of the effect
based on the firms’ stock of temporary workers before the crisis in order to classify them.
2While the INPS data do not provide us with the information on the different com-
ponents making up wages, for some sectors, we were able to find occupation-specific
information on the nationally negotiated base salaries (see Section 5) and to distinguish
the evolution of the nationally negotiated part from the remaining part of the wage,
which includes bonuses (also agreed through firm level negotiations) and overtime
among other things.
3Before 1993, the wage inflation adjustment was practically automatic through an in-
dexation mechanism. The abolition of this mechanism was found to be associated with
a decline in downward real wage rigidities (Devicienti et al., 2007).
4In line with the predictions of existing models (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2004; Ger-
tler and Trigari, 2009), we observe that wages of job movers and new entrants respond
more to the cycle. In the rest of the section, we focus on job stayers, whose wages are,
in general, more stable.
5This is the annual total gross wage, net of firms’ social security contributions.
6Note that we consider daily wages, but since we only take the sample of the so-
called super stayers, these are variations coming from variations in annual wages not in
days per year. The figures we find are indeed very similar if we look at the variations in
annual wages for our sample.
7That is the distribution of delta wages when wages are fully flexible.
8These are firms belonging to the Bank of Italy INVIND sample of 20 or more
employees.
9In line with Verdugo (2016) and Elsby et al. (2016).
10The large drop observed in 1993 is likely to be due to the abolition of the wage in-
dexation mechanism (see the next section and Devicienti et al., 2007 for more details).
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11The excess growth observed in 2008 partially reflected the renewal of several major
collective contracts that also involved one-off payments in order to compensate for
unusually long delays in their renewal (e.g. around 300 euros to metalworkers).
12The large drop in the skewness observed in 1998 for the construction workers may
be related to the introduction of apprenticeships.
13Bonuses of this type are usually determined through firm-level bargaining that is
not widespread among smaller firms.
14Unfortunately INPS data do not contain information about the presence of a firm
level agreement with social parties, so we cannot analyse this aspect. However, firm-
level agreements are not very widespread in Italy: according to the INVIND survey of
the Bank of Italy, in 2010 only around 20 per cent of medium/large firms (of more than
20 employees) engaged in some form of firm-level negotiations.
15Source: Diritto and Pratica del Lavoro and http://www.cnel.it/home.
16Both contracts were renewed in 2008, before the hit of the crisis.
17Even before 1993, when the indexation mechanism was in place, there was evidence
of the existence of a compensating differential between the indexed and the non-
indexed part of the wage (see Manacorda, 2004). For Scandinavian countries, Hibbs
and Locking (1996) and Holden (1998) find that increases in nationally negotiated wage
have little offsetting effect on wage drift.
18Ideally, we would like to observe hourly wages and not just daily wages. In the ab-
sence of hours worked, controlling for overtime hours allows us to partially exclude the
possibility that the adjustment of daily wages is operated exclusively through the adjust-
ment of overtime hours.
19We performed various robustness exercises around the absolute and relative thresh-
old of the number of job stayers in the window [60, 100] (and [60%, 80%]), and the re-
sults were very similar.
20Where accessions and separations are computed as the sum of all accessions that
took place between 2008 and t.
21We start with a sample of around 4000 firms in 2009 and we are left with less
than 2000 firms for which the skewness, the turnover measures and all the controls
are not missing. This reduction in the sample is mainly due to the fact that we lose
quite a few observations by restricting the sample to firms that we observe both in
the period 2003–2008 and in all the years between 2009 and 2013. Moreover, we
dropped around 60 firms that we could not match with the INPS data and around 60
firms for which the employment data from INPS and INVIND displayed great
discrepancies.
22Note that the β obtained with our specification is very similar to the β obtained
through the following specification: yit = δi + αpost08t + βpost08t skewnessi + γskew-
nessi + uit (by taking the difference between t and 2008 of the previous equation, we
obtain Eq. 1). With our specification, however, it is easier to evaluate how the effect
evolved over time by just changing the reference period t of our dependent variable
Δyi,t − 08.
23Another alternative mechanism is that, being the temporary workers usually youn-
ger and less experienced, they are paid less on average and they therefore have a higher
probability of being paid the national wage. It may therefore be more likely to fire tem-
porary workers just because they belong to the set of workers for whom it is not
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possible to cut wage further and not because of their type of labour contract (and asso-
ciated firing costs). We find however that, even controlling for the average wage level
in 2008 (which proxies the share of workers close to the contractual minimum thresh-
old), the turnover is much higher in firms characterized by a higher share of temporary
workers in 2008 (results available upon request).
24Firing is very difficult for firms with more than 15 employees in Italy.
25Additional estimates (available upon request) indicate that more rigid firms
have a higher probability of exiting the market in 2013. This would entail that the
samples of more rigid firms with and without temporary workers are not fully
comparable in 2013.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to an anonymous referee and the editor, Matteo Bugamelli, Francesco D’Amuri, Raffaella Nizzi, Alfonso
Rosolia, Paolo Sestito, Eliana Viviano and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy for useful comments and help.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy.
Responsible editor: Juan Jimeno
Competing interests
The IZA Journal of Labor Policy is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The authors declares
that they have observed these principles.
Received: 22 June 2016 Accepted: 24 November 2016
References
Adamopoulou E, Bobbio E, De Philippis M, Giorgi F (2016) Allocative efficiency and aggregate wage dynamics in Italy,
1990-2013. In: Bank of Italy Occasional Paper., p 340
Akerlof GA (1982) Labor contracts as partial gift exchange. Q J Econ 97:543–569
Brandolini A and Rosolia A (2015) The Euro area wage distribution over the crisis. Banca d’Italia, Rome Mimeo
Bulligan G, Viviano E (2016) Has the wage Phillips curve changed in the Euro area? Evidence from four countries.
In: Banca d’Italia occasional working paper., p 355
Campbell C, Kamlani K (1997) The reasons for wage rigidity: evidence from a survey of firms. Q J Econ 112:759–789
Cappellari L, Dell’Aringa C, Leonardi M (2012) Temporary employment, job flows and productivity: a tale of two
reforms. Econ J 122:188–215
Card D and Hyslop D (1997) Does inflation “grease the wheels of the labor market?” In: Romer C and Romer D (eds)
Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, vol 30. National Bureau of Economic Research Studies in Business
Cycles, Cambridge
D’Amuri F (2014) Composition effects and wage dynamics in Italy. Banca d’Italia, RomeMimeo
Daly M, Hobijn B, Wiles T (2011) Dissecting aggregate real wage fluctuations: individual wage growth and the
composition effect. In: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco., p 23
D'Amuri F, Fabiani S, Sabbatini R, Tartaglia Polcini R, Venditti F, Viviano E, Zizza R (2015) Wages and prices in Italy
during the crises: the firms’ perspective. In: Bank of Italy Occasional Papers., p 289
Devicienti F, Maida A, Sestito P (2007) Downward wage rigidity in Italy: micro-based measures and implications.
Econ J 117:F530–F552
Dickens W, Goette L, Groshen E, Holden S, Messina J, Schweitzer M, Turunen J, Ward M (2007) How wages change:
micro evidence from the International Wage Flexibility Project. J Econ Perspect 21(2):195–214
Ehrlich G and Montes J (2015) Wage rigidity and employment outcomes: evidence from German administrative data.
University of Michigan, Ann ArborMimeo
Elsby M, Shin D, Solon G (2016). Wage adjustment in the great recession and other downturns: evidence from the
United States and Great Britain. J Labor Econ. Forthcoming. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/
682407.
Eurostat (2002). "Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community, Rev.1.1 (2002) (NACE Rev.
1.1)", Luxembourg.
Gertler M, Trigari A (2009) Unemployment fluctuations with staggered Nash wage bargaining. J Polit Econ 117:38–86
Goette L, Sunde U, Bauer TK (2007) Wage rigidity: measurement, causes and consequences. Econ J 117:469–477
Guvenen F, Ozkan S, Song J (2014) The nature of countercyclical income risk. J Polit Econ 122:621–660
Hibbs DA Jr, Locking H (1996) Wage compression, wage drift and wage inflation in Sweden. Labour Econ 3:109–141
Holden S (1998) Wage drift and the relevance of centralised wage setting. Scand J Econ 100:711–731
Holden S, Wulfsberg F (2008) Downward nominal wage rigidity in the OECD. B E J Macroecon (Advances) 8(1):15
Kahn S (1997) Evidence of nominal wage stickiness from microdata. Am Econ Rev 87:993–1008
Knoppik C, Beissinger T (2009) Downward nominal wage rigidity in Europe: an analysis of European micro data from
the ECHP 1994-2001. Empir Econ 36:321–338
Kurmann A, McEntarfer E, Spletzer J (2014). The nature of wage adjustment in U.S. firms: new evidence from worker-
firm linked data. Drexel University, Philadelphia Mimeo
Lemieux T (2006) Increasing residual wage inequality: composition effects, noisy data, or rising demand for skill?
Am Econ Rev 96:461–498
Adamopoulou et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2016) 5:22 Page 31 of 32
Manacorda M (2004) Can the scala mobile explain the fall and rise of earnings inequality in Italy? A semiparametric
analysis, 1977–1993. J Labor Econ 22:585–613
Pischke JS (2016) Wage flexibility and employment fluctuations: evidence from the housing sector. In: NBER Working
Paper., p 22496
Postel-Vinay F, Robin JM (2004) To match or not to match? Optimal wage policy with endogenous worker search
intensity. Rev Econ Dyn 7:297–331
Stiglitz JE (1986) Theories of wage rigidity. In: Butkiewicz J, Koford K, Miller J (eds) Keynes’ Economic Legacy:
Contemporary Economic theories. Praeger Publishers, New York, pp 153–206
Verdugo G (2016) Real wage cyclicality in the Euro zone before and during the Great Recession: evidence from micro
data. Eur Econ Rev 82:46–69
Adamopoulou et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2016) 5:22 Page 32 of 32
